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We investigate the utility of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations of the position and momentum of photon
pairs from parametric down-conversion in the implementation of a secure quantum key distribution protocol.
We show that security is guaranteed by the entanglement between down-converted pairs, and can be checked
by either direct comparison of Alice and Bob’s measurement results or evaluation of an inequality of the sort
proposed by Mancini et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 120401 2002.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum-communication protocols using photonic qubits
have been proposed and implemented, utilizing entanglement
in several degrees of freedom of the photon 1. Perhaps the
most promising application of quantum communication us-
ing photons is quantum key distribution QKD 1,2, in
which entangled or single qubits are sent from sender to
receivers and used to establish a secret random key string,
which can then be used to securely transmit a data string.
Most QKD schemes are inspired by the original single-qubit
Bennett-Brassard 1984 BB84 3 or entangled-qubit Ekert
4 protocols. In the BB84 protocol, cryptographic security is
provided by the partial indistinguishability of non orthogonal
states and the no-cloning theorem, while the security of the
Ekert protocol is guaranteed by violation of Bell’s inequality.
For photon pairs, obtained from spontaneous parametric
down-conversion SPDC, entanglement in polarization 5
and energy-time 6 have been most widely and sucessfully
used.
There have also been QKD proposals based on continuous
variable-field quadratures of multiphoton beams 7. Again,
security of these protocols is based on either measurement of
non commuting observables and the no-cloning theorem or
violation of some classical inequality.
In this paper, we present an experiment which demon-
strates a protocol for QKD based on the position and mo-
mentum degrees of freedom of entangled photons created by
SPDC. Recently, it has been shown that the difference be-
tween the positions of entangled SPDC photons along with
the sum of their momenta are Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
EPR correlated, or, in other words, entangled 8. These
correlations are interesting not only for their direct relation to
the seminal paper by EPR 9, but also for their possible
application to quantum-information tasks. However, it is not
obvious that position and momentum degrees of freedom can
be used to represent a qubit in the same way that is done with
polarization. In this regard, it is not clear as to what extent
the position and momentum degrees of freedom of photon
pairs can be used in quantum-communication protocols such
as, for example, quantum cryptography, quantum teleporta-
tion, etc. Here we provide an experimental investigation that
shows that the position and momentum degrees of freedom
of photon pairs can be used to implement a secure quantum
key distribution protocol. To our knowledge, the work we
present here is the first quantum-information protocol based
on position and momentum entanglement of the form origi-
nally proposed by EPR.
Any practical QKD scheme should be viable over long
distances. Under ideal conditions, long-distance implementa-
tion of our QKD scheme presents no problem, since it has
been demonstrated that it is possible to protect entanglement
of transverse spatial degrees of freedom from divergence due
to free-space noise-free propagation of the down-converted
photons 11. As in any implementation of a free-space quan-
tum communication system, however, free-space transmis-
sion can cause errors due to air turbulence, absorption, scat-
tering, etc. Absorption and scattering lead to losses, which of
course reduces the data transmission rate. But as long as the
losses are below a given threshold, they do not compromise
the security of the QKD protocol 2. Errors caused by fluc-
tuations due to air turbulence and other factors which do not
lead to losses can deteriorate the correlation between the
photon pairs, which leads to an increased bit error rate. How-
ever, these fluctuations can be accounted for using a classical
reference beam, as in 12. We will further discuss long-
distance implementation in Sec. V.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we present
the QKD protocol, and discuss basic security issues in Sec.
III. Section IV shows experimental results confirming the
utility of position and momentum EPR correlations in QKD.
In Sec. V we discuss potential advantages provided by our
system as well as the implementation of our protocol over
long distances.
II. THEORY
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the basic QKD apparatus.
The protocol works as follows. Twin photons are created by
a SPDC source. One photon of each pair is sent to Alice A,
and one to Bob B. At each of Alice and Bob’s stations, a
random selection between detection in the position x or*Corresponding author. Electronic address: phsr@if.ufrj.br
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momentum p basis is performed by a 50-50 nonpolarizing
beam splitter. A measurement in the x basis is easily per-
formed by a lens imaging the crystal onto the detection
plane. It is well known that a measurement in the p basis can
be implemented by a lens with crystal and detection planes
in its focal planes 13, as was done in Refs. 8.
Before any photons transmitting potential key bits are ex-
changed, Alice and Bob calibrate their x detectors for posi-
tions Ax1 and Ax2 and Bx1 and Bx2, and their p detectors at
positions Ap1 and Ap2 and Bp1 and Bp2, respectively. Let us
assume that, in both bases, detector position “1” “2” repre-
sents the 0 1 logical level. From the multimode theory of
SPDC 11,14, it is possible to show that, for ideal point like
detectors, the probability to detect photon pairs is
PxxA,B  WA + BA − B2 1
for a position-position xx configuration. The notation “ij”
refers to the situation where Alice measures in the i basis and
Bob in the j basis, where i , j=x , p. Here W is the field profile
of the pump beam at the crystal face. We define the param-
eters OA / 2IA and OB / 2IB, which are related to
the magnification factors of Alice’s and Bob’s imaging sys-
tems. We have also assumed that both imaging lenses have
been placed so as to obey the thin-lens equation. The  func-
tion appears due to the fact that we have considered ideal
point like detectors. Since the pump beam profile W can be
made much larger than the  function, it is possible to find
positions A and B such that W is approximately constant.
Similarly, for a momentum-momentum pp configura-
tion,
PppA,B  v kAf A + kBf B	
2
, 2
where v is the angular spectrum of the pump beam at the
crystal face. If they measure in the same basis, Alice and Bob
can calibrate their detectors so that they see a large correla-
tion in their coincidence measurements. For example, if Al-
ice detects a photon at Ax1, then the probability for Bob to
detect a photon at Bx1 will be much greater than the prob-
ability to detect a photon at Bx2. In general, Alice and Bob
can choose positions such that
PAx1,Bx1 
 PAx2,Bx2 0, 3
PAx1,Bx2 
 PAx2,Bx1 
 0, 4
where PA ,B is the coincidence detection probability. The
same is true for measurements in the p basis:
PAp1,Bp1 
 PAp2,Bp2 0, 5
PAp1,Bp2 
 PAp2,Bp1 
 0. 6
Moreover, Alice and Bob can adjust their detection systems
such that PAx1 ,Bx1
PAx2 ,Bx2
PAp1 ,Bp1

PAp2 ,Bp2. In the interest of simplicity, we will remove
the subscripts on the probabilities Pij whenever redundant.
The security of the QKD protocol is conditioned on the
fact that the correlation is low when the measurements are
performed in different bases, so that very little information is
shared. For example, if Alice detects a photon at Ax1, then
the probability for Bob to detect a photon at Bp1 should be
the same as the probability to detect a photon at Bp2. Using
the standard theory of SPDC, the coincidence detection prob-
ability for an xp configuration is
PxpA,B  WA2, 7
while a px configuration gives
PpxA,B  WB2. 8
There is no correlation in the detection probabilities 7 and
8. Thus, Alice and Bob can choose their detector positions
such that PAx1 ,Bp1= PAx1 ,Bp2= PAx2 ,Bp1
= PAx2 ,Bp2= PAp1 ,Bx1= PAp1 ,Bx2= PAp2 ,Bx1
= PAp2 ,Bx2.
To generate a secret key, Alice and Bob perform a series
of measurements on a number of photon pairs until they have
accumulated N coincidence events, where N depends on the
size of the key and the level of security required. All events
in which only one or neither of them detect a photon are
discarded. After the N photon pairs have been detected, Bob,
through classical communication, informs Alice of his mea-
surement basis x or p for each photon. On average, Alice
and Bob measure in the same basis 50% of the time. They
keep these photons and discard the rest. Alice then chooses m
FIG. 1. Color online Diagram of quantum key distribution
using position and momentum variables of down-converted pho-
tons. The SPDC source emits photons entangled in position and
momentum. Lenses are used to create the image position measur-
ments or Fourier transform momentum measurements in Alice
and Bob’s detection planes. The 50-50 non polarizing beam splitters
BS are used to choose randomly between position and momentum
measurements.
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of the remaining photon pairs at random and tells Bob to
reveal his measurement result. She then uses these photon
pairs to check for an eavesdropper by comparing her mea-
surement results with those of Bob. The presence of an
eavesdropper is registered by a deterioration of the quantum
correlation observed in the xx or pp coincidence events. If
the error rate is below a given threshold, then Alice and Bob
can be sure that any eavesdropper has obtained an insignifi-
cant amount of information about the secret key. They can
then use classical privacy amplification and information rec-
onciliation protocols to increase security and reduce errors in
the key 15.
III. SECURITY
We will now discuss the security of this protocol. There
has been much work in security proofs for a wide variety of
attacks on QKD systems 2. We will limit our discussion to
incoherent attacks, in which the eavesdropper Eve has ac-
cess to one photon pair at a time. Here we provide a security
argument for a simple attack, and leave more complex at-
tacks for future work.
If Eve steals one or both photons, then no coincidence is
detected, the event is discarded and no information is ob-
tained by Eve. One way for Eve to obtain information is
based on an intercept-resend type strategy 2, in which she
steals one or both photons, measures and thus destroys
them, and then replaces them with new photons. We note
here that we call this type of general attack, in which Eve can
measure in any basis, an intercept-resend “type” strategy, in
contrast to the usual intercept-resend strategy found in the
literature in which Eve measures in Alice and Bob’s bases.
As in the BB84 or Ekert protocols using qubits, in this attack
Eve’s presence is marked by a deterioration of the correlation
in Alice and Bob’s measurements.
One method of testing security is through the quantum bit
error rate QBER, which can be defined as a function of the
“wrong” and “right” detection probabilities 2:
QBER = P
wrong
Pwrong + Pright
. 9
In order to simplify the analysis of our experimental results,
we will not assume that Pwrong+ Pright=1. With no eavesdrop-
per present, in our notation the QBER is given by
QBER0 =

j=x,p

s,t=1,2
st
PAjs,Bjt

j=x,p

s,t=1,2
PAjs,Bjt
. 10
There are many different attack strategies that Eve can
adopt 2. As an example, let us consider that Eve imple-
ments the usual intercept-resend strategy on Bob’s quantum
channel. Let us suppose that Eve is completely aware of
Bob’s detection system and has constructed an identical one
of her own, and denote RijA ,E as the coincidence detec-
tion probability for Alice and Eve, where i , j=x , p. Then,
Alice and Eve’s detection probability is the same as that of
Alice and Bob: RijA ,E= PijA ,B. She intercepts and
measures Bob’s photon, giving one of the following results:
Ex1 ,Ex2 ,Ep1 ,Ep2, or a null count. She then prepares a pho-
ton in the eigenstate corresponding to her measurement re-
sult and sends it to Bob. We will consider only the cases
where Eve detects a photon. Then, for a given photon pair,
Alice, Bob, and Eve detect photons with probability
PijkA,B,E = RikA,EpjB;k , 11
where i , j ,k=x or p , pjB ;k is the probability that Bob will
detect Eve’s replacement photon in basis j given that it was
prepared in basis k, and we now limit ourselves to the cases
where A ;B, and E are one of Alice, Bob, or Eve’s pre-
defined measurement positions Ax1 ,… ,Bx1 ,… ,Ex1 ,…. If
Eve chooses the same measurement basis as both Alice and
Bob, then she can go essentially undetected, since
PiiiA,B,E = RiiA,E = PiiA,B , 12
which is the detection probability that Alice and Bob expect.
Here we have assumed Eve’s best-case scenario, in which,
given that she is completely aware of his detection system,
she can replace Bob’s photon in such a way that piB ; i
=1. However, if Eve chooses the wrong basis, then, for the
cases in which Alice and Bob expect a large detection prob-
ability PiiA ,B:
PiijA,B,E = RijA,EpiB;i PiiA,B , 13
when i j. This follows from the fact that RijA ,E
= PijA ,BPiiA ,B and piB ; j1. In other words,
the eavesdropping reduces the correlation between Alice and
Bob’s measurements. Similarly, if Eve intercepts the pair of
photons by another equally entangled pair, she is essentially
playing the role of the source and the protocol is not affected
16. If she replaces the pair of photons by non- or less-
entangled photons, then similarly the correlation between Al-
ice and Bob’s measurements is reduced and Eve’s presence
can be detected.
Assuming that Eve measures every one of Bob’s photons
in a basis x or p chosen at random, the QBER for Eve’s
intercept-resend strategy is
QBER =

j=x,p

s,t=1,2
st
PAjs,Bjt + 	

i,j=x,p

s,t=1
2
PAjs,Bjt
, 14
where
	 = 
j,k=x,p
jk

s,t=1
2
pjBjt;kPAjs,Bjt 15
is the error due to Eve’s disturbance when she measures in
the wrong basis. Here we have assumed that RAjs ,Ejt
= PAjs ,Bjt.
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From the argument above it is demonstrated that eaves-
dropping reduces the correlation between Alice and Bob’s
measurements, and that this correlation is guaranteed by an
EPR-like state. The EPR character can be demonstrated, as
in Ref. 8, by satisfying the inequality 17

2Axi − Bxi
2Apj + Bpj
2
4
. 16
To check for the presence of Eve, Alice and Bob can either
check the correlations between m pairs of their N measure-
ment results by calculating the QBER, or use these m pairs to
verify Eq. 16.
IV. EXPERIMENT
We have performed measurements which demonstrate the
security of a QKD protocol using position and momentum
variables by testing the correlations between position-
position and momentum-momentum coincidence detections,
as well the non correlation between position-momentum and
momentum-position detections in a typical twin photon set
up. The experimental configuration is shown in Fig. 2. We
use a femtosecond pulsed Ti-sapphire laser doubled by a
2-mm-long barium bismathate crystal, obtaining a violet
beam with wavelength centered around 425 nm. Using the
violet beam to pump a 1-cm-long lithium iodate crystal,
down-converted signal and idler photons were produced and
detected in different wavelengths with interference filters
centered at 890 nm with 10 nm bandwidth and 810 nm with
50 nm bandwidth. We use avalanche photodiode single-
photon-counting modules equiped with short-focal-length
lenses often called objective lenses, because the focal
lengths are short, but they play the role of oculars and a thin
slit at the entrance. The slits are oriented so that the horizon-
tal dimension is 3 mm and the vertical dimensions are 0.2
mm for position measurements and 0.5 mm for momentum
measurements. When detection is performed in the position
basis, the crystal face is imaged by a 15-cm-focal-length lens
placed 20 cm from the crystal. The detectors are placed 60
cm from the lenses, giving a magnification factor of 3, which
allows us to image a narrow region with the 0.2 mm detec-
tion slits. The pump beam is a Gaussian beam with spot size

2 mm at the crystal face. For measurements in the momen-
tum basis, a 15-cm-focal-length lens is used and the detec-
tors are placed 30 cm from the crystal face, so that the crystal
plane and the detection plane coincide with the focal planes
of the lens.
Results of the experimental investigations are displayed in
Figs. 3–6. All curves are Gaussian fits and error bars repre-
sent errors due to Poissonian photon-counting statistics. In
all measurements detector A was kept fixed while B was
scanned linearly in the vertical direction. Setting detectors A
and B for position measurements, we expect to see a large
correlation in coincidence measurements. Figure 3 shows the
coincidence count rate when detector B is scanned along the
vertical axis and detector A is fixed at position Ax1 triangles
and also when A is fixed at Ax2 circles. The peaks of the
coincidence distributions are separated by about 1 mm,
which is also the separation between Ax1 and Ax2, implying
a good position correlation. The width of these distributions
is basically defined by the convolution of the slit apertures in
both detectors 14.
Figure 4 shows the coincidence count rate when momen-
tum measurements are performed at both stations. Detector B
FIG. 2. Color online Experimental arrangements used to test
correlations in position and momentum degrees of freedom. For
position measurements a lens is used to image the face of the non
linear crystal NLC onto the detection plane, while for momentum
measurements both the crystal face and the detection plane lie at the
focal points of a lens see text.
FIG. 3. Color online Experimental results for xx
configurations.
FIG. 4. Color online Experimental results for pp
configurations.
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was scanned while detector A was fixed at Ap1 triangles
and Ap2 circles. Ap1 and Ap2 are separated by 1 mm and
the separation between the coincidence peaks is about 1 mm,
showing a good momentum correlation. The widths of these
curves also depend on the overlap between the detection ap-
ertures, as the momentum measurement is actually mapped
onto measurements of the detector positions.
To show that the two-photon state is indeed EPR corre-
lated, we calculate the variances in inequality 16 using data
from Figs. 3 and 4, obtaining

2Ax1 − Bx1 = 0.152 ± 0.003 mm2,

2Ax2 − Bx2 = 0.080 ± 0.002 mm2,

2Ap1 + Bp1 = 0.912 ± 0.0172 mm−2,

2Ap1 + Bp1 = 0.875 ± 0.902 mm−2. 17
These values give an average of 
x
2
p
2
= 0.10±0.022,
which satisfies inequality 16 by about five standard devia-
tions.
The security of our QKD protocol is based on a large
correlation when measurements are performed in the same
basis and low correlations when measurements are per-
formed in complementary bases. The measurements in Figs.
3 and 4 show that the correlation between position-position
measurements and momentum-momentum measurements are
very high. Now we are going to demonstrate that the corre-
lation between position-momentum and momentum-position
is negligible.
The coincidence profile for the xp configuration is shown
in Fig. 5. Here detector B is scanned in the p configuration
with detector A fixed at Ax1 triangles and Ax2 circles.
There is no correlation between Alice and Bob’s measure-
ments in this case since the coincidence profile is approxi-
mately constant for all positions of detector B, as expected
from Eq. 7. The slight “enveloping” visible in the coinci-
dence counts is due to a small modulation in the single
counts as detector B is scanned not shown. Detector A po-
sitions Ax1 and Ax2 were chosen so that the coincidence rate
is approximately the same for both cases. We will show be-
low that this is necessary to guarantee the security of the
distributed key.
Figure 6 shows the coincidence profile for the px configu-
ration, where B is scanned in the x basis with detector A
fixed at Ap1 triangles and Ap2 circles. As expected from
Eq. 8, the coincidence count rate reproduces the transverse
intensity profile of the pump field as a function of Bob’s
detector position only, which shows that in this case there is
no correlation between Alice and Bob’s measurements.
Using the results in Figs. 3–6, Bob can choose his detec-
tor positions so that the security conditions discussed in Sec.
II are best satisfied. Examining the figures, it is most advan-
tageous to define Bx1=1 mm, and Bx2=2 mm,Bp1=1 mm
and Bp2=2 mm. Table I shows the coincidence counts for
every possible measurement at Alice and Bob’s stations,
from which it can be seen that the correlation between mea-
surements in the same basis and the non correlation between
measurements in different bases. There is a slight discrep-
ency among the on-diagonal coincidence count rates. A fine-
tuning of the coincidence levels can always be acheived by
using neutral filters in front of the detectors so that the on-
diagonal terms are approximately equal.
From Table I and Eq. 10, the QBER in the absence of an
eavesdropper would be QBER0=0.047±0.001. The QBER
for xx measurements is QBER0xx=0.064±0.001 and
QBER0pp=0.027±0.001 for pp measurements. The security
criterion for most QKD protocols is a QBER of less than
about 0.15 2. For a QBER above this limit it is impossible
FIG. 5. Color online Experimental results for xp
configurations.
FIG. 6. Color online Experimental results for px
configurations.
TABLE I. Coincidence counts for Alice and Bob’s chosen de-
tector positions.
Alice
Bob Ax1 Ax2 Ap1 Ap2
Bx1 943±31 72±8 700±26 655±26
Bx2 67±8 1079±33 671±26 765±26
Bp1 462±21 492±22 956±31 22±5
Bp2 614±25 591±24 29±5 876±30
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to establish a secret key, even with one-way error correction
and privacy amplication. Since our QBER is much lower
than this limit, it should be possible for Alice and Bob to
establish a secure secret key.
We can use the xp and px measurement results to predict
the effect of an eavesdropper. Using the results in Table I in
Eq. 14, the estimated QBER if Eve were to measure every
one of Bob’s photons in a randomly chosen basis x or p
would be QBER=0.296±0.001 where we have assumed
that pjBjt ;k=1/2 for all t and jk in Eq. 15. In other
words, we have assumed that if Eve measures in the wrong
basis, she has a 50% chance of sending the “correct” replace-
ment photon. We see that Eve’s presence is clearly marked
by an increase in the QBER.
V. DISCUSSION
We will first mention two possible advantanges that can
be exploited in our QKD system and then describe possible
implementation over long distances in free space.
a Possible advantages. One possible advantage pro-
vided by the use of these degrees of freedom is that entangle-
ment in position and momentum is easily obtained, since it is
a direct consequence of the inherent phase matching condi-
tions in the parametric process, and can be obtained using
thick non linear crystals, which allows for higher-flux
sources. Another possible advantage is that position and mo-
mentum are continuous variables, which opens the possibil-
ity of using higher-dimensional alphabets. For instance, it is
possible to use D-dimensional spatial qudits as described in
Ref. 10 in an improved protocol which would allow for a
higher data transmission rate.
b Long-distance implementation. As in all experiments
involving free-space transmission of entangled photons over
long distances, there are two main problems. i Losses by
absorption or scattering: This kind of problem is independent
of the degree of freedom used. Therefore, for the same wave-
length and beam diameter, the losses are the same for polar-
ization, time bin, position-momentum, or any other degree of
freedom of the electromagnetic field. ii Errors which result
in a rotation in phase space: In free-space propagation, these
errors could possibly be caused by turbulence or fluctuations
of the refractive index of the atmosphere. It is reasonable to
suppose that free-space propagation is a unitary evolution,
since a losses will be filtered out by coincidence detections
and b the coherence time on the order of hundreds of
femtoseconds of the down-converted photons is so short
that it would be unrealistic to consider that fluctuations of the
refractive index of the atmosphere occurred at a similar time
scale. Therefore, any error results in a rotation in phase
space. However, the correlation between photon pairs is
maintained, since local unitary operations cannot destroy en-
tanglement. The problem is that we no longer know in which
basis to measure in order to observe the appropriate correla-
tions. This problem can be overcome by use of a reference
beam, such as used in other schemes 12. The classical ref-
erence beam is setup in such a way as to experience the same
propagation as the down-converted fields. In practice, the
reference beam would be dynamically monitored in such a
way as to make dynamical corrections to the detection sys-
tems, i.e., adjustments to the positions of Alice and Bob’s
imaging and Fourier transform lenses. We note that changing
the lens position is equivalent to performing a rotation in
phase space. In this way, errors can be detected and mini-
mized.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent work 8 has shown that photon pairs created by
spontaneous parametric down-conversion exhibit entangle-
ment in position and momentum, of the sort originally pro-
posed in the fundamental paper by Einstein, Podolsky, and
Rosen 9. Here we have extended these ideas by experimen-
tally investigating the implementation of a quantum key dis-
tribution protocol based on the quantum correlations between
position and momentum of entangled photon pairs. In addi-
tion to interest due to the relation with historical debates on
quantum theory, quantum key distribution based on position
and momentum of photon pairs might offer some advan-
tages. First, using these degrees of freedom allows for the
use of long nonlinear crystals, therefore opening the possi-
bility of having really high flux entangled-photon sources.
Second, it might be possible to extend these results to higher-
dimensional systems as in Ref. 10, which could be used in
quantum-communication protocols such as quantum bit com-
mitment 18.
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